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Shareholders’ Agreement 101 – Do I Need One?

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Why do you need a shareholders’ agreement?

When friends or family members come together to form a company, more often than not, they will not consider the need for a shareholders’ agreement as they tend to rely on mutual trust, respect and confidence. Of course, this generally works perfectly when the business is doing well and profitable, and while the shareholders are receiving their expected return on investment. But what if things turn sour? Whether the business is not doing well or trust and confidence morph into distrust and suspicion, what can shareholders do? In circumstances like these, the shareholders’ agreement comes into play. A well drafted shareholders’ agreement should be able to offer a solution to the parties in most cases. As with any other agreement such as those for sale and purchase, and loan transactions, the importance of a shareholders’ agreement is to safeguard interests of the shareholders and if disputes arise between the parties, there is an agreement they can fall back on setting out clearly what the parties can or cannot do, and shall or shall not do.

What is a shareholders’ agreement?

Shareholders’ agreement is an essential agreement between the shareholders of a company and the company itself. It can be between the company and all or just some of the shareholders; for instance, a company with different classes of shares and holders of different classes of shares might prefer to separately enter into a shareholders’ agreement with the company instead of with holders of all classes of shares. A shareholders’ agreement is used to govern the company’s management and operation and sets out all the rights and obligations between the shareholders and the company. A shareholders’ agreement is particularly important for third party investors investing in an existing company or business or when unrelated parties come together to form a new company.

What terms are to be included in a shareholders’ agreement differ according to the parties’ needs and bargaining power and/or the particular type of business. Still, a typical shareholders’ agreement normally consists of the following terms:

  • the type of business the company will run
  • the management of the company, i.e., the composition of the board of directors and any committees
  • the right of shareholders to nominate directors
  • frequency, procedures for convening and holding board meetings and shareholders’ meetings
  • matters which require simple majority, super majority or unanimous votes
  • specific obligations of shareholders
  • dividend policy
  • issue of new shares and admission of new shareholders
  • transfer of shares
  • anti-dilution mechanism
  • deadlock
  • minority shareholder protection
  • further financing needs of the company
  • non-competition undertaking by shareholders
  • term and termination of the shareholders’ agreement
  • dispute resolutions

If investments are to be made in stages, the shareholders’ agreement would normally include the timetable for capital contribution, share subscription by the shareholders, shareholding structure and other typical clauses in a share subscription agreement.

Minority protection

Where a company has only two shareholders, one of them holds 51% (majority shareholder) and the other one holds 49% (minority shareholder) of the issued shares, the minority shareholder typically has no control over how the company will be managed and operated as the minority shareholder will be out-voted by the majority shareholder at general meetings, assuming all decisions only require a simple majority vote, i.e., >50%, of the shareholders to pass. However, according to the Companies Ordinance (Cap.622, Laws of Hong Kong), certain decisions of a company are required to be passed by special resolutions, i.e., passed by at least 75% of the voting shares. These decisions include the alteration of the articles of association, change of the company’s name, reduction in the share capital of the company, etc., meaning that the majority shareholder in the above case cannot simply pass a resolution by itself to alter the articles of association of the company. In addition to those decisions specified in the Companies Ordinance that must be approved by special resolutions, to protect their interests, the minority shareholder will negotiate with the majority shareholder for other matters to be passed by special resolutions which are not otherwise required so by law. Common examples include capital expenditure above a certain amount, disposal of material assets, change in the company’s principal business, further financing through equity or borrowings or change in dividend policy, etc. 

Often when an investor invests in a business as a minority shareholder, the investor is in fact investing in the experience, expertise and knowledge in the industry and business operation of the company’s management team who are normally the majority or founding shareholders of the company. In case the majority shareholders decide to divest and sell their shares, the investor could also consider selling their shares as there may be uncertainty as to the management, operation and profitability of the business once the company changes hands. Hence, the investor will almost inevitably request a “tag-along right” to be incorporated in the shareholders’ agreement, giving the investor the right but not the obligation to co-sell its shares on the same terms to the prospective buyer of the majority stake. 

A minority investor would normally request a non-competition undertaking from the company and the majority shareholders to oblige them not to engage in any business operations or investment in other businesses that are similar to or in direct competition with that of the company. This is to avoid any negative impact on the profitability of the company. 

Majority protection

Not only do minority shareholders need a shareholders’ agreement to protect their interests, majority shareholders also have certain interests that require safeguarding. A potential nightmare for a majority shareholder could be when they have found a prospective buyer willing to buy-out 100% of the company but the minority shareholder refuses to sell their shares. What happens next is the entire deal falls through. To avoid this, the shareholders’ agreement should include a clause whereby if the majority shareholder decides to sell all of their shares in the company to a third-party buyer, they will have the right (but not the obligation) to request the minority shareholder(s) to also sell their shares in the company on the same terms. Once requested by the majority shareholder, the minority shareholder(s) will be obligated to sell their shares. Contrary to the tag-along right afforded to minority shareholders, such a right is known as the “drag-along right” of the majority shareholder.

In addition, a majority shareholder would not want any information relating to the business operations, prospects, customers, suppliers, financial information or trade secrets being disclosed to any third party, especially competitors, or shares in the company sold to competitors. Therefore, specific clauses that deal with the use and disclosure of confidential information and on the restrictions on the transfer of shares will need to be incorporated in the shareholders’ agreement to address the majority shareholder’s concerns.

Equal shareholdings

Suppose every shareholder in a company holds the same percentage of shares, for example, there are five shareholders each holding 20%. In this case, where there is no majority shareholder, would any of the majority or minority protection provisions mentioned above still apply? If two or more shareholders join hands and outnumber the rest in terms of shareholdings, arguably there will be a (collective) majority camp against the minority shareholders. What if none of the shareholders can agree on an issue? Circumstances like this is commonly known as a “deadlock” situation, where things come to a standstill and cannot move forward. If a deadlock situation continues, it could seriously affect the continued operation of the business. A well-drafted shareholders’ agreement should have specific provisions incorporated to cater for deadlocks and provide mechanisms to resolve issues. 

Shareholders’ agreement vs Articles of Association

Whether the terms of a shareholders’ agreement will be reflected in the company’s articles of association very much depends on the parties’ wishes. In Hong Kong, the articles of association of a company are public documents and can be searched and obtained for a fee by anyone. If the articles of association of a company is amended to incorporate and reflect terms of the shareholders’ agreement, all such terms incorporated in the articles of association will also become public information. Hence, whether the terms of the shareholders’ agreement will be incorporated in the articles of association and how much of it should be incorporated becomes another area of negotiation between the shareholders and the company. Suppose certain terms of the shareholders’ agreement differ from the articles of association, such as the quorum for a board meeting, and the parties decide not to amend the articles of association to reflect the same, should the shareholders comply with the articles of association or the shareholders’ agreement? To avoid this embarrassing situation, it is always good practice to include a clause in the shareholders’ agreement to the effect that if there is any contradiction or discrepancy between the shareholders’ agreement and the articles of association, the terms of the shareholders’ agreement will prevail.

If you wish to find out more about whether you need a shareholders’ agreement for your company, how to protect your interests, and what terms should be included in your shareholders’ agreement, please feel free to speak to members of our corporate and commercial team.

January 2021

Simon Wong
+852 2186 4848 / +852 9460 9816
simon.wong@oln-law.com
Partner, Corporate & Commercial
Oldham, Li & Nie

Problems for Your Family by Not Leaving a Will

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When someone passes away without having put into place a valid will, the ‘Law of intestacy’ governs the administration and distribution of their estate. In Hong Kong, the two key pieces of this legislation are the Intestates’ Estates Ordinance (Cap. 73) (the “IEO”) and the Non-contentious Probate Rules (Cap. 10A) (the “Rules”).

Before dealing with the deceased’s estate, a Grant of Letters of Administration must be obtained from the Probate Registry. Individuals who are allowed to apply for a Grant of Letters of Administration of the deceased’s estate are those set out in rule 21 of the Rules, in the following order of priority:

1.    A surviving spouse
2.    Children
3.    Parents
4.    Siblings
5.    Grandparents
6.    Uncles and aunts.

Those who are successful in obtaining a Grant of Letters of Administration are the administrators and are empowered to deal with the estate in accordance with the IEO.

After obtaining the Grant of Letters of Administration and having arranged for the funeral of the deceased, the administrator should first collate all the assets of the deceased and settle any debts and expenses. After that, the administrator should distribute the estate to the beneficiaries in accordance with section 4 of the IEO, with the table below illustrating some examples of entitlement under section 4 of the IEO.

Order of Entitlement When There is No Will

 Surviving RelativesStatus of Other RelativesEntitlement Arrangement
1.SpouseNo issue* of the deceased, parent, full sibling or issue* of full sibling All to the surviving spouse
2.Spouse and issue* of the deceasedOther relatives immaterialThe surviving spouse takes the personal chattels, HK$500,000 and half of the residuary estate. The other half is held on statutory trust** for the surviving issue*.
3.Spouse and one or more of the following relatives, namely:
parent or
full sibling or
issue* of full sibling 		 The surviving spouse takes the personal chattels, HK$1,000,000 and half of the residuary estate. The other half is held for the surviving parent(s) or on statutory trusts for the surviving full sibling(s).
4.Issue* of the deceasedNo spouseAll to the surviving issue* on statutory trust. 
5.Parent(s)No spouse, no issue* of the deceasedAll to parent(s)
6.Full siblingsNo spouse, no issue*, no parentAll to full siblings on statutory trusts**
7.Half siblingsNo spouse, no issue*, no parent, no full siblingsAll to half siblings on statutory trusts**
8.Grandparent(s)None of the aboveAll to grandparent(s)
9.Full uncles and auntsNone of the aboveAll to full uncles and aunts on statutory trusts.
10.Half uncles and auntsNone of the aboveAll to half uncles and aunts on statutory trusts.
11.None of the above relatives All to the Hong Kong Government as unowned property.
    
*Issue in succession law means the descendant of a person, such as children and grandchildren.
**For details on statutory trusts, please refer to the IEO

Despite the prescribed entitlement under the IEO, beneficiaries of an estate may sometimes redistribute their entitlement through a Deed of Family Arrangement executed by all beneficiaries and setting out the agreed redistribution of the deceased’s estate. Do note though that the redistribution through a Deed of Family Arrangement may attract stamp duty. 

While the law prescribes a specific priority for the distribution of an intestate’s estate and may leave certain wiggle room for beneficiaries to alter their entitlement, it would certainly be useful to make a valid will to ensure your estate will be inherited exactly as planned. 

If you have any questions or would like to obtain further information on our probate and estate planning services, please contact one of the members of our Probate and Estate Planning team, who are listed here: https://oln-law.com/probate-estate-planning.  

This article is for information purposes only. Its contents do not constitute legal advice and readers should not regard this article as a substitute for detailed advice in individual instances.

January 2021

OLN Lawyers Contribute to Lexis Nexis on Start up Sale & Purchase

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Sharing their knowledge and expertise on Start up Sale and Purchase Agreements, Partners Anna Chan and Victor Ng have contributed to the ‘Hong Kong Encyclopedia of Forms and Precedents’ by LexisNexis Second Edition, 2020 Reissue. This is Hong Kong’s only collection of precedents which covers all the key areas of commercial law and general practice.

Please click here for more information.

新冠疫情暴露了香港破损的法院制度亟待修复

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此文章由高国峻律师撰写发表于2020年12月28日《南华早报》

11月，习近平主席重申”坚持走中国特色社会主义法治道路”，中国法律界全体成员必须”确保忠于党、忠于国家、忠于人民、忠于法律”。

这些言论进一步激起了香港有关司法独立完整性的辩论。然而，香港广泛的法律界只关注形势如何发展，而完全忽视了“法庭上的大象”。香港的法院制度正在遭到破坏。在法庭上处理民事案件，包括婚姻诉讼而花费时间是荒谬的。拖延正义就是拒绝正义。 

我们的法院制度就像一辆备受推崇的老式劳斯莱斯，“法治”为其标志性女主角。但不幸的是，座椅的皮质已破旧，油漆也几十年没有翻新过，发动机需要彻底检修，电子配件也状态欠佳。 

最重要的是，法院缺乏长期应对新冠疫情的能力。香港法院从二月至四月在第一波疫情期间关闭，就约有9万宗案件受到影响，占年度案件总量的近20%。随着时断时续的限制措施，法院逐渐恢复，直到出现了第四波疫情。法院虽然会保持开放，但随着限制社交距离措施的收紧，将会再次导致聆讯和审议庭数量的减少。

由于大量出现的庭审延迟和停滞，人们为此付出了巨大的代价。想想那些离婚的夫妻：在疫情爆发之前，由于家事法庭的严重积压，他们等待聆讯的时间就要长达9个月。而现在，随着法庭的关闭和限制社交距离措施，这些额外出现的延迟，给这些家庭尤其是孩子们，在本已痛苦不堪的离婚过程中带来了更大的伤害。

Jarndyce v Jarndyce是查尔斯·狄更斯在《荒涼山莊》中虚构的一个法庭案件，是关于高等法院对一笔巨额遗产处理的故事。这个官司旷日持久，一直延续到第三代人才得以解决。它虽然最终以原告取得胜利结束，但全部遗产最终却用来支付了诉讼费，“竹篮打水一场空”。这是狄更斯对法庭诉讼旷日持久和费用昂贵的批判，在这个故事里，他建议任何可能成为原告的人：”忍受任何错误都比你来这里打官司要强”！

这些话放在任何司法管辖范围内都是至理名言——如果你能解决，就绝不要上法庭。不过，如果我们看看香港破损的法院制度，这尤其贴切。如今一个向高等法院提出索赔要求的原告可能需要等待长达18个月才能轮到聆讯。但即使取得判决成功，裁决的执行也遥遥无期。

金钟的香港高等法院不仅是费用排名前10%的诉讼管辖区之一，也是诉讼进程最慢的后20%之一。

对原告来说这并不是仅有的。许多被告对他们提出索赔，但在被告花费了大量法律费用以及漫长地等待，到为他们辩护之后，才发现这些索赔是毫无根据的。对于原告而言，令人痛心的是，尽管这是一个有成功机会的案件，但他们只有在被告有时间处置了任何资产或者以其他方式申辩贫穷之后才会被带到法庭上。

即使是官司打赢了，执法也是不确定的，很可能整个过程要花费双倍的时间。再加上上诉程序，可能会使当事人在法庭上的时间再次翻倍。因此，香港的法律制度令律师和大众都非常焦虑和气愤也就不足为奇了。

这种状况与我们法官的优秀素质毫无关系。我们的司法部门做得很好，我们应该全力支持他们。这只是因为缺少辅助工作人员和法官以及流行的根深蒂固但却不合时宜的做事方式导致的结果。比如，不用电子档案，却带着大量盒装文件上法庭的几百年前的旧习惯，但现在只要个ipad就够了。

为了视野更加开阔，OLN最近通过帮助创建国际律师事务所网络Globalaw，对全球54个司法管辖区的诉讼程序进行了调查。

调查发现，在这54个司法管辖区中，香港不仅是诉讼费用排名前 10% 的司法管辖区之一，而且也是诉讼进程最缓慢的后20%之一。香港有理由为自己的法律制度感到自豪，但香港的法律制度就像那辆老劳斯莱斯一样，花费昂贵却反应迟钝，亟需进行大修。

其他司法管辖区已经表现出愿意利用技术手段来提高法院制度的效能，并且在疫情期间已行之有效。例如，英国多年来一直在其法院制度中使用视频会议和远程解决方案。新加坡自2000年以来就有了无纸化法院，这使得他们能够在整个疫情期间使用电子档案系统。

在香港，我们迫切需要加倍努力，集中精力进行法院制度的修缮工作。我们必须彻底地修复法律制度的基础设施，以阻止它继续妨碍法院发挥效力，使他们为公众的利益工作而不是为律师的利益而工作。
如果我们想以自己的法律制度为傲，那么就让我们从彻底改革法院制度开始。我们生活在21世纪而不是狄更斯的同时期。

高国峻律师是OLN的高级合伙人。他是一位资深的香港律师和商人。

Lasmos案及以后：鱼与熊掌可以兼得吗？

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作者：梁泳泽律师

(本文章发表于2020年5月的《香港律师》杂志上：http://www.hk-lawyer.org/sites/default/files/e-magazines/HKL-MAY-2020/viewer/desktop/index.html?doc=917CC81E9107138E6C05E7B46F3C9397#page/34)

法庭该如何处理就仅基于指称债务（其为某仲裁条款之标的事项）而提出的清盘呈请呢？仲裁条款与清盘呈请之间的相互作用，导致近期普通法司法管辖区中出现互相矛盾的判决。尽管普遍接受的是，清盘法律程序不具可仲裁性，因此不存在因仲裁而自动、强制性或非酌情地搁置对清盘法律程序，但当以酌情权决定涉及仲裁条款的清盘法律程序应否予以搁置或撤销时，不同普通法司法管辖区法院却采纳了不同的方案。具体而言，该等不同方案是：

  1. 只有当与指称债务有关的争议是基于真正及充分理由，才应搁置或撤销有关呈请（传统方案）；
  2. 除完全例外情况外，应一律搁置或撤销有关呈请，而不必调查与该指称债务有关的争议是否真正基于充分理据（Salford Estates方案）；
  3. 除特殊情况外，呈请一般应予撤销，前提是债务人已采取仲裁条款下规定的步骤（Lasmos方案）。

上述各方案的主要差别已在其他地方详述 （例如见《仲裁条款对清盘呈请的影响：不管怎样，仲裁解决？》一文，香港律师，2019年11月号），在此不予赘述。本文将批判性地探讨Lasmos方案及提出如何调和各方案，并主张容许法庭在无管辖权情况下，裁定某项指称债务（其为某仲裁条款之标的的事项）是否存在真正及实质性的争议，是要鱼与熊掌、二者兼得。最后，本文会恭敬地提出Salford Estates方案是香港应当采纳的唯一合乎逻辑的方案以作总结。

Lasmos方案

回顾在Re Southwest Pacific Bauxite (HK) Ltd [2018] 2 HKLRD 449一案中，原讼法庭法官夏利士对传统方案不予采纳，并裁定倘符合以下三项条件，一般而言应撤销清盘申请（除特殊情况外）：

  1. 有关公司对指称债务提出争议；
  2. 产生指称债务的合约包含一项仲裁条款，当中涵盖任何与该债务有关的争议；
  3. 有关公司采取仲裁条款所规定的步骤，以开展合约规定的争议解决程序。

（Lasmos方案）

前两项要求并不存在争议。就第三项要求而言，其值得密切关注的是它代表了尊重诉讼各方选择争议解决机制与保留债权人就债务（其为仲裁条款标的事项）在受限情况下提出呈请之权利两者间的一个创新妥协。尽管夏利士法官清楚知悉，仲裁庭假如已在实际处理相关争议事项，法庭便不应以无力偿债为由将债务人公司清盘，但假如该公司并未在有关仲裁条款下采取任何其规定的步骤，则清盘程序仍可进行。在这一新看法下，「仅依据该仲裁条款」就债务提出争议仍有欠妥善。

上诉法庭的观点

目前为止，上诉法庭已在两宗破产案件的判案中审视Lasmos方案。该两宗案件的上诉皆被驳回，原因是Lasmos方案中的要求未完全被遵守。尽管Lasmos方案在该两宗案件中未获正式采纳，但它实质上订定了在涉及仲裁条款的情况下，将清盘呈请予以搁置或撤销的必要条件。就本文目的而言，上诉法庭的看法很有趣。

在But Ka Chon v Interactive Brokers LLC [2019] 4 HKLRD 85一案中，上诉法庭提到债权人获赋予法定权利，以无力偿债为由提出清盘呈请。要求债权人在符合该三项要求后证明存在特殊情况，使该法定权利的行使被排除或限制，乃违反公共政策。上诉法庭看来认为，即使已开始进行仲裁，但法庭仍可裁定该指称债务是否确实存在实质性的争议。此外，清盘程序被认为有别于以一般令状提起的诉讼，原因是前者仅属于集体补救(class remedy)，并不涉及强制执行合约或就当事方之权利及责任作出裁定，因此法庭仅根据未获承认的债务（其为仲裁之标的事项）来审理清盘呈请并非有违常理。上诉法庭虽然承认传统方案可能未给予仲裁条款充份重视，但并未明确说明多重视才算充分。

在Sit Kwong Lam v Petrolimex Singapore Pte Ltd [2019] HKCA 1220一案中，第三项要求被认为是「明智的」，因为它向法庭证明债务人有真正的仲裁意图，而，「仅因为仲裁协议的存在，便将清盘呈请撤销或搁置则是不合常理」。债务人若对债权人并无实质性申索，上诉法庭认为债务人仍应展开仲裁程序，并要求作出无法律责任的宣告，以表明其具有「真正仲裁意图」。

评论

采纳Lasmos的第三项要求并非完全不存在问题的。首先，此项要求源自何处尚不清晰。

第二，这项要求反常地扭转了由债权人（原告人）展开按合约规定的争议解决程序之通常责任，并将该责任置于债务人（被告人）身上，这与按兵不动，只等待原告人采取行动的一般抗辩策略相违背。作者对为何存在此项要求提出质疑，尤其是夏利士法官认为，在不首先确定债务人公司是否具有真正抗辩理由情况下，反对要求债权人就某项争议进行仲裁是不合理的做法。同样不明确的情况是，是什么法律规则明确规定，债务人须在有关的时效期限届满之前的任何特定时间根据仲裁条款下采取其列明步骤。

第三，也许亦是最重要的一点是，这项要求似乎并无逻辑上的依据。正如鲍晏明法官（其当时的职位）在Re Jade Union Investment Ltd [2004] HKEC 306一案中裁定的，即使债务人有责任证明有关债务事实上是具有实质争议理由而提出，但根据仲裁条款展开的仲裁，与所需证明无关，因其本身并不能履行该举证责任。不管如何，即使债务人公司并无采取积极步骤进行仲裁，也并非必然可以说当债权人实际展开仲裁时，债务人公司并无真正意图对债务提出异议。

尽管（如上诉法庭在But Ka Chon一案所提出的）仲裁已展开，但法庭仍可以裁定有关债务并非真正在具有充分理由的情况下提出的争议，则似乎并无好的理由说债权人不应主动展开仲裁并同时提出将债务人公司清盘的呈请。正如上诉法庭在But Ka Chon一案中批评债务人逾四年时间并未采取任何步骤展开仲裁一般，这批评同样也可以加诸于债权人上，况且假如债权人主动展开仲裁（原告人通常会作如此） ，将可节省许多时间。法庭显然了解对一旦展开的仲裁进行干预所具的敏感性，因此要求债务人借仲裁寻求宣告没有法律责任，从而保留债权人仅凭债务（其为某项仲裁条款之标的事项）而向债务人提出呈请的权利。

仅根据仲裁条款的存在而撤销或搁置清盘呈请，此举是否合理呢？道理也许是这样。如果是就某项指称债务而提出清盘呈请，法庭最终必须考虑该公司是否无力偿债（Hollmet AG v Meridian Success Metal Supplies Ltd [1997] 4 HKC 343）。假如债务不存在，便不可能有无力偿债情况的出现。因此，当仲裁庭可以裁定根本无债务存在时，法庭仅基于受仲裁管辖的指称债务，便以无力偿债为由将一家公司清盘，这做法并不合理。在法庭对指称债务的实质并无司法管辖权情况下，让其裁定关于指称债务的争议，是否真正具有实质理由而提出，绝对是有违逻辑。债权人（呈请人）不可能兼得鱼与熊掌的。

另一方面，Jinpeng group Ltd v Peak Hotels and resorts Ltd BVI HCMAP 2014/0025 案及 2015/0003案被引用作为尽管仲裁已展开但法庭仍行使酌情决定权任命清盘人的例子。看虽如此，但经仔细审视，该案事实上并不支持表面看似的结论。

首先应当指出的是，在Jinpeng案中任命清盘人的申请是基于公平公正理由而提出（而并非基于无力偿债理由）。虽然东加勒比上诉法庭对债务进行了审视，并认为并非基于真正及实质性的理由提出争议，但仲裁的展开被认为是「一项有利于批准搁置原诉申请以等待仲裁结果的因素」。 Jinpeng案因此带出对指称债务的争议是否基于真实及实质性理由而提出来进行审视是浪费时间，尤其是在仲裁已展开的时候，因为在该项决定与仲裁展开之间作出权衡并不能为清盘提供理据。最终，任命清盘人的理据是绝大部分贷款收益都不知所踪而无从作出交待这个无法被接受的情况。因此，Jinpeng案实际上与Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd v Altomart Ltd (No 2) [2015] 3 WLR 491案是相符而非有所区别的。 Jinpeng案的该等令人不可接受的情况可说是「例外」（按Salford Estates方案的说法），原因是它与指称债务的存续无关。

难题

鉴于以无力偿债为由提出清盘呈请的法定权利，以及并不存在自动搁置清盘法律程序以利进行仲裁的做法，法庭应如何处理一项仅就某项指称债务而提出之法定索求，而其在当中并无司法管辖权的清盘呈请？这项难题的出现，似乎是由于法庭太快接纳一项在法定索求中提出的指称债务。这情况在Hollmet一案中最为显见。罗杰志法官（其当时的职位）当时称：「在我看来，在某项争议获得适当确立之前，债务将会存在」。个人认为，这一说法属不合逻辑。债务之所以存在，并非因为债务人适当确立争议的存在，而是因为债权人履行了其债务举证责任。

尽管并不适用于清盘情况，《破产条例》第9条（其规定在聆讯过程中，法庭必须要求证明呈请债权人的债务）及《破产规则》第70条（其规定凡债务人已给予争议通知的事项均须予以证明）可就上述主张提供支持，即就债务进行举证的责任是在呈请债权人身上（Re Glory Garment Factory [1985] HKEC 475）。

正如夏利士法官在Lasmos案内被认可的是，尽管应否作出清盘令的问题属于不可仲裁，但并不能因此认为，呈请人与该公司之间与就确立呈递清盘呈请书之地点而依据的债务有关之争议同样是不可仲裁的。某项指称债务倘为仲裁条款之标的事项，那么法庭便无权裁定呈请债权人是否已履行与指称债务有关的举证责任，原因是法庭对此并无司法管辖权。因此，法庭接下来要裁定的真正问题是，除了该指称债务外，是否还有其他情况可以证明清盘令的作出是有理据的（即是在Salford Estates方案中提及的特殊情况）。

解决方法

解决这项难题的明显处理方法是采用Salford Estates方案，而它在逻辑上是无法反驳。然而，目前在普通法领域中对此尚没有普遍共识。

毫无疑问，Salford Estates方案的确让人产生一些疑虑，因为与其他债权人相比，Salford Estates方案使仲裁条款下的债权人处于劣势，从而使仲裁的吸引力降低（参看《仲裁条款对清盘呈请的影响：不管怎样，仲裁解决？》一文，同上）。然而，并无法律政策规定仲裁应成为最受惠的争议解决机制。通过同意接纳一项将法庭对指称债务之司法管辖权夺走的仲裁条款，当事方应接受所有随之而来的合理的后果。

不管怎样，正如Jinpeng案所显示的，现时仍然能以公正公平理由或以一般的无力偿债理由来为清盘提供理据。仲裁条款下的债权人仅须提出在没有支付指称债务（其作为仲裁条款之标的事项）以外的证据及情况来为清盘令提供理据。最后，本文期望当有适当案件在终审法院席前受审理时，终审法院会采取合乎逻辑那个方案。

附言

在本文出版的过程时，香港和新加坡作出了两个相关的判决。

在Re Asia Master Logistics Limited [2020]HKCFI 311（于2020年3月12日颁布）案中，暂委高等法院法官王鸣峰资深大律师切实地肯定了在传统方案下债务人公司必须证明受仲裁条款管辖的债务是真正具有实质理由而被争议才可搁置或撤销清盘诉讼程序。对传统方案最有力的论点是，法院在清盘程序中没有对指称债务的是非曲直（merits）作出裁定，因此不违反仲裁条款。虽然这在技术上是正确的，但冒昧地说，这并不能为一个逻辑上的矛盾提供任何解说，即一家公司可能会因被指控的未付债务（其为仲裁条款所管辖）而被清盘，而仲裁庭有可能判定该债务并不存在。

在Anan Group (Singapore) Ptd Ltd诉VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company) [2020] SGCA 33（于2020年4月7日颁布）案中，新加坡最高法院上诉法庭改变笔锋地采纳Salford Estates方案。这判决应当受到欢迎，其中阐述的理据也值得称赞。然而，该法院似乎认为，法院有广宽的酌情权，基于其指称债务（其为仲裁条款所管辖）上，对该公司进行清盘（原因是债务人公司缺乏真诚 （bona fides） 或滥用程序）。冒昧地说，这种建议的正确性备受怀疑。以那案中的例子为例，如果债务人对其以前明确和反复承认的债务提出确实的争议，争论点应是债务人是否可以撤销其以前的承认，而此争论点应通过仲裁裁定。在此谦卑地指出，除非清盘呈请书是基于一般破产或公正公平的理由（并非仅基于仲裁条款管辖下特定债务的法定要求偿债书），否则如果该指称债务未被承认，法院一般应搁置或驳回该呈请书。

致谢

作者在此感谢Anselmo Reyes（芮安牟）教授对本文题材提供的宝贵意见。

高李严律师行在2021年《亚太法律500强》评选中榜上有名

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高李严律师行在2021年的《亚太法律500强》评选中榜上有名，并在其中两个类别被评为“推荐律师事务所”，这两个类别是：

高李严律师的两名律师被《亚太法律500强》评为各自业务领域的“领先律师”，他们是：

两名律师都被《亚太法律500强》的研究员给予良好的评价。详情可到《亚太法律500强》的官方网站得到更多资讯: https://www.legal500.com/firms/30993-oldham-li-nie/30842-hong-kong-hong-kong/?layout=asia-pacific&token=d9d71f53ac6572f267a067cd8f62ee64