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Arbitration

Reconciling Conflicting Arbitration Clauses: Try to Make the Worst Seem Better

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(This article was published in the November 2024 Issue of the Hong Kong Lawyer)

International commercial and financial transactions are becoming increasingly complex with the formation of series of inter-related contracts. Regrettably, parties often attach little importance and give little thoughts to the design of dispute resolution clauses in various related contracts, resulting in inconsistency. Reconciling such inconsistent dispute resolution clauses,to the extent possible, is key to avoiding increased costs, inconvenience and delay in separate, satellite litigations and arbitrations, and more importantly conflicting rulings that breed injustice.

In AAA, BBB and CCC v DDD [2024] HKCFI 513, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance attempted to reconcile such inconsistent arbitration clauses by resorting to the“centre of gravity” approach (the “COG Approach”) in AmTrust Europe Ltd v Trust Risk Group SpA [2015] EWCA 437. Unfortunately the inconsistent arbitration clauses in AAA could not be reconciled, leaving an undesirable risk of contradictory outcomes.

This article aims to examine the COG Approach. It will be argued that the COG Approach is inapt to reconcile conflicting arbitration clauses. A brightline party-based approach, drawing from the one-stop shop presumption in Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, will be proposed to determine a single forum for the resolution of issues inter related in a series of contracts. It will be further argued that where conflicting arbitration clauses in the same series of contracts are of equal force and effect, they shall be held as invalid arbitration clauses insofar as overlapping issues are concerned for failing to give binding rulings.

AAA, BBB and CCC v DDD [2024] HKCFI 513

In AAA, the Lender, the Borrower and the Guarantors entered into a Loan Agreement subject to HKIAC arbitration with a three-arbitrator Tribunal. As security for the loan, the Borrower issued a Promissory Note signed by the Borrower and Guarantors to the Lender, which Promissory Note was also subject to HKIAC arbitration but without specifying the number of arbitrators. The Loan Agreement was subsequently amended by the Amendment Agreement which incorporates the arbitration clause of the Loan Agreement.

As it usually happens, the Borrower failed to repay the loan, and hence the Lender commenced arbitration under the Loan Agreement against the Borrower and the Guarantors. The Lender proposed inclusion of relief based on the Promissory Note, which sparked this whole battle on whether the Tribunal formed under the Loan Agreement had jurisdiction over the Promissory Note.

The Court first noted that there are significant differences between the two arbitration clauses (e.g. the (non-)specification of the number of arbitrators) and that the Tribunal was constituted under the arbitration clause in the Loan Agreement and not the Promissory Note.

Whilst acknowledging the ideal of a one-stop shop for the resolution of the parties’ related disputes as stated in Fiona Trust, the Court opined that the ideal may not be achieved in “generalized paradigm” situations where the conflicting dispute resolution clauses in multiple related contracts indicate the parties’ contrary intention not to have a one-stop shop.

Adopting and applying the COG Approach in AmTrust, the Court considered which arbitration clause has a “closer connection” with the dispute over the Promissory Note. Rather naturally, in the end the Court held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over claims under the Promissory Note. The Court helpfully provided further guidance on applicable mechanisms to minimise risks of conflicting outcomes, including appointing the same Tribunal for or consolidating all related arbitrations, which should always be attempted first to avoid the thorny scenario of conflicting arbitration clauses.

The “Centre of Gravity” Approach Inapplicable to Conflicting Arbitration Clauses

The Court’s attempt to salvage a disaster is certainly admirable. Parties should be ultimately responsible for the messy situation they knowingly and voluntarily put themselves in. After all, salvage is not supposed to be a perfect remedy for disasters. Similarly the COG Approach is not without its problems.

Firstly and obviously, as fairly accepted by the Court, the COG Approach may be a vague concept, and the determination of an issue’s “centre of gravity” or“closeness” to a dispute resolution clause may be convoluted, especially because the contracts are inter-related and the issues are intertwined. Indeed, different judges and arbitrators may give different weight to different factors and hence the determination exercise will likely give rise to uncertainty, unpredictability and unnecessary disputes between the parties.

Secondly, the irony of the COG Approach is that, although the Court recognises that there are multiple applicable arbitration clauses and that there is a need to construe the parties’ intentions to determine which arbitration clause(s)to apply, the “close connection” test has no apparent connection with the parties’ intentions.

More importantly, the application of the COG Approach appears not to sit well with the well-established principle that Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law does not permit withholding arbitration on the basis of forum non conveniens (Kaverit Steel and Crane Ltd v Kone Corp. (1992)87 DLR (4th) 129). The “close connection” test in the COG Approach essentially resembles the forum non conveniens test. To be a meaningful exercise, the COG Approach must involve some sort of “displacement” or “invalidation” of an otherwise valid and binding arbitration clause (even though the substantive effect was downplayed to “take precedence over” the arbitration clause only), but this is essentially impermissible under the UNCITRAL Model Law.

Jurisdiction clauses may be “taken precedence over” such that court proceedings may be stayed, nevertheless the same may not apply to arbitration clauses. Indeed, in AmTrust, when the English Court of Appeal devised the COG Approach, it considered whether the arbitration clause in the subsequent Framework Agreement was supposed to capture disputes under the earlier Terms of Business Agreement which contained an English jurisdiction clause. Similarly, in X v Y [2021] 2 HKC 68, the COG Approach in AmTrust was applied to determine whether the arbitration clause in the Mandate covered a dispute under the Pledge which contained a Singapore jurisdiction clause. In H v G [2022] HKCFI 1327, the COG Approach in AmTrust was applied to determine whether the arbitration clause in the Building Contract covered a dispute under the Warranty which contained a non-exclusive Hong Kong jurisdiction clause. The COG Approach appears not to be intended, and it is slippery to extend the COG Approach, to deal with the scenario of conflicting arbitration clauses.

The Brightline Party-Based Approach

In AmTrust, the English Court of Appeal took the view that the one-stop shop presumption in Fiona Trust has limited application to conflicting dispute resolution clauses scenario because as Rix J held in Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe)Ltd v MLC (Bermuda) Ltd [1999] CLC 579 at 590, “where different agreements are entered into for different aspects of an overall relationship, and those different agreements contain different terms as to jurisdiction, it would seem to be applying too broad and indiscriminate a brush simply to ignore the parties’ careful selection of palette.” However, with respect, the two propositions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, if the parties’ choices of arbitration clauses are generally respected except that the overlapping aspect of related contracts is presumed to be dealt with by one of the parties’ chosen arbitration clauses. he question is – how to determine that one arbitration clause for the overlapping aspect.

The following brightline party-based approach is respectfully proposed to determine which arbitration clause applies in the multiple conflicting arbitration clauses scenario:

  1. Since the parties have express arbitration clauses in multiple related contracts, the starting point is that the parties’ express choice of forum should be respected, except for such overlapping issues between inter-related contracts.
  2. Where there are overlapping issues between inter-related contracts, those issues should be presumed to be governed by the last arbitration clause agreed to by all the relevant parties (i.e. the last common will).

To illustrate, consider the following example. Suppose there are three related contracts in the following sequence:

(a) Contract (arbitration clause) 1: Parties A and B
(b) Contract (arbitration clause) 2: Parties A, B and C
(c) Contract (arbitration clause) 3: Parties B and C

Regarding overlapping issues common to three contracts, in line with the one-stop shop presumption in Fiona Trust, the arbitration clause 2 should be presumed to invalidate the other competing arbitration clauses. There should be a common “oh of course” kind of implied term in the arbitration clause 2 (being the last arbitration clause between all relevant parties) that in relation to overlapping issues: arbitration clause 1 should be presumed to be superseded(Monde Petroleum SA v WesternZagros Ltd [2015] EWHC 67, [38]); parties B and C should be presumed to be bound not to enter into the arbitration clause 3 to have outcomes that contradict those of the arbitration clause 2.

Mutual Invalidation of Arbitration Clauses?

Needless to say, whilst the party-based approach is objective, certain and in line with the Fiona Trust presumption, it would not cover at least the following three scenarios:

(i) There is no one single arbitration clause in the multiple related contracts that captures all relevant parties.
(ii) There are more than one arbitration clauses that capture all relevant parties but they are entered into simultaneously.
(iii) The parties deliberately intend to have conflicting arbitration clauses leading to contradictory outcomes.

Regardless of the reasons, in these scenarios there are multiple arbitration clauses applicable to overlapping issues in multiple related contracts. Arguably these arbitration clauses fail to give any binding decision. After all, no one can possibly be “bound” by two completely opposite decisions on the same factual matrix. In these circumstances, instead of forcing an imaginary intention upon the parties, it appears fair that all such arbitration clauses should be invalidated for failing to result in a binding decision enforceable by legal process (IS Prime Ltd v TF Global Markets (UK) Ltd & Ors. [2020]EWHC 3375 (Comm), [43] – [50]).

Mutual invalidation of arbitration clauses may appear to be a radical measure to take. But one should bear in mind that the parties are always free to agree to a workable dispute resolution mechanism to avoid the radical measure. If the parties insist to have conflicting and unworkable arbitration clauses, it is unclear why the public policy should facilitate such multiple satellite proceedings with difficulties, increased costs and delay that ultimately produce contradictory outcomes giving rise to injustice, contrary to the object of the whole arbitration regime to have fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expense.

Conclusion

Conflicting dispute resolution clauses applicable to multiple related contracts are problematic. Leaving aside the fragmentation of the dispute resolution process with the increased costs and time involved, what is unacceptable is the risk of contradictory rulings causing injustice. The problem is even more acute when conflicting arbitration clauses are involved, not only because the circumstances to invalidate arbitration clauses are narrow, but also because enforcements of contradictory arbitral awards are extremely messy. When disaster hits, no salvage is perfect.

Prevention is always better than cure. It is hoped that parties to complex multi-contract transactions think through how they wish their disputes under related contracts to be resolved, consistently and efficiently.

Oldham, Li & Nie to Host “Arbitration and Justice: the Compromise on Insolvency, Illegality and Conflicting Arbitration Clauses?” Panel During the 2024 Hong Kong Arbitration Week

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Oldham, Li & Nie (OLN) is pleased to announce its participation in the 2024 Hong Kong Arbitration Week, organised by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), taking place on 21-25 October 2024.

The firm will host a panel session titled “Arbitration and Justice: the Compromise on Insolvency, Illegality and Conflicting Arbitration Clauses?” on 22 October 2024 from 5:00 to 6:30 pm.

This debate session will critically examine the compatibility between arbitration and substantive/procedural justice in light of the latest case authorities, including:

  1. Sian Participation Corp (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd [2024] UKPC 16, Re Simplicity & Vogue Retailing (HK) Co., Limited [2024] HKCA 299, and Arjowiggins HKK 2 Limited v Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Limited [2024] HKCA 352: The availability of bankruptcy / winding-up tools for arbitration-governed debts
  2. AAA v DDD [2024] HKCFI 513: The complication of incompatible arbitration clauses in multi-contract transactions
  3. G v N [2023] HKCFI 3366: The interplay between arbitration and illegality

The session promises to deliver a thorough examination of these critical issues from various expert perspectives.

The distinguished panel will feature:

  • Prof. Anselmo Reyes, International Judge at Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC)
  • William Wong SC, Barrister at Des Voeux Chambers
  • Frances Lok SC, Barrister at Des Voeux Chambers
  • Sarah Thomas, Associate General Counsel of McKinsey & Company

They will be joined by OLN’s lawyers, Partners Dantes Leung and Jonathan Lam, with Associate Davis Hui serving as the moderator. Each panelist will offer unique insights, contributing to a robust and enlightening debate.

For more information about the 2024 Hong Kong Arbitration Week, please visit https://hkaweek.hkiac.org/event/f3e694d2-39ac-451c-aa66-cb9d9af52bc2/summary. 

To register, please visit https://hkaweek.hkiac.org/event/f3e694d2-39ac-451c-aa66-cb9d9af52bc2/regProcessStep1.

无债项下清盘：香港法院应彷效枢密院原地踏步?

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(这篇文章发表在 2024年八月香港律师会会刊)

在Sian Participation Corp v Halimeda International Ltd [2024] UKPC 16 案 中， 枢 密院对仲裁与破产清盘之间的相互关係作出了翻天复地的改变，重新确认「 传统方法」是英属维京群岛的判决：儘管呈请破产清盘的债项受仲裁协议管辖，但只有在公司证明该债项存在真诚而重大争议时，法庭才应搁置或驳回该呈请。枢密院认为，此案亦适合再来个一石二鸟： (1) 推 翻 英 国 案 例 Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd v Altomart Ltd (No 2) [2015] Ch 589，即当未获承认的清盘呈请债项受仲裁协议管辖，除非在完全特殊的情况下，清盘呈请应被驳回或搁置（「 Salford Estates 方法」），及 (2)当清盘呈请债项受专有外地司法管辖权条款管辖，法庭採取与仲裁条款相同的基本政策。

Sian 案无疑是晴天霹雳，令普通法的仲裁圈子彻底震惊，不仅因为近十年来英国法院没有对 Salford Estates 方法作出任何重大的负面评价，而且因为 Salford Estates 方法基本上已获其他普通法司法管辖区的最高法院採用（儘管有修改），例如新加坡上诉法院在 AnAn Group (Singapore) PTE Ltd v VTB Bank [2020] SGCA 33 的 判决和香港终审法院在 Guy Kwok-Hung Lam v Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP [2023] HKCFA 9 的判决（「 Guy Lam终审案」）（判词由澳洲高等法院前首席法官范礼全颁下）。如今英国法院的取向急剧转变，香港法院是否也该效法呢？

本文将审慎研究 Sian 案的理据。我等谨认为，枢密院仅打败了一个稻草人，却未能回答最根本的问题 ——是否存在合资格的债项来触发清盘制度以容许法庭行使任何酌情权。我等谨认为，法庭对受仲裁条款（至少在事实争议的层面而言）或专有外地司法管辖权条款管辖的呈请债项没有最终决定权，故无法判定是否存在合资格的债项。作为作者在 2020年 5 月刊登的文章《Lasmos 案及以后：鱼与熊掌可以兼得吗？》的续集，我等谨建议香港法庭採用 Salford Estates 方法是唯一不可抗拒而合乎逻辑的方法。

极端的 Sian 案：刁鑽的事实引致糟糕的法律?

Sian 案是一宗典型的贷款追讨案件，被申请人因上诉人未能偿还贷款而申请上诉人清盘，而上诉人则声称对被申请人有交相申索。

首先必须指出， Sian 案是极其特殊的。鉴于上诉人没有就初审的事实裁定提出上诉，上诉人因而承认没有真正或实质的理由争议清盘呈请债项。在这基础上，枢密院採取了实际的观点，认为在这种情况下要求债权人进行仲裁可能只会在没有任何好处下增加延误、麻烦和费用 (Sian, [92])。

实际作业而言，这种公开承认没有真正或实质理由争议清盘呈请债项的情况极为罕见。更常见的情况是债务人就债项提出某些争议，而法庭认为该些争议不真实及不实质。如果呈请债项受仲裁条款管辖，法庭是否可以充满信心地认为仲裁庭必然会得出与法庭完全相同的结论，即必然存在合资格的债项来触发清盘制度?

没有债务下清盘?

法庭显然无权随意把公司清盘。普通法司法管辖区的破产清盘法列明将公司清盘的特定途径。例如，根据香港《公司 ( 清盘及杂项条文 ) 条例》（ 《香港清盘条例》 ）第 177 条，公司可因无能力偿付其债项而被法院清盘。如债权人希望证明公司无能力偿付债项，债权人可根据《香港清盘条例》第 178 条的推定条文，针对相等于或超过港币 10,000 元的算定债项发出一份法定要求偿债书，或严谨证明该债项 (Cornhill Insurance plc v Improvement Services Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 114)。因此，如果呈请清盘公司的理由仅是公司无力偿还呈请债项，于逻辑而言，法庭发出清盘令前必须先决定「债项」是否存在。

因此 ， 在 Guy Kwok-Hung Lam v Tor Asia Credit Master Fund LP [2022] 4 HKLRD 793 案（「 Guy Lam 上诉案」）中，香港上诉法庭裁定，首先，破产程序中确实存在有关公司债项的司法裁定 ([68])；其次，在债权人被认定为债权人之前，他根本没有资格提交任何呈请书 ([77])。同样地， Guy Lam 终审案中，范礼全法官没有排除强制搁置破产程序以诉诸仲裁的可能性 ([91])。

枢密院试图消除这个明确的逻辑，解释发出清盘令「只是一个公司无力偿债的临时假设。这个假设最终可能不是真实，但不会使清盘程序无效」。我等谨认为，这种说法只是一个稻草人 —— 当清盘呈请关乎特定的呈请债项，真正的问题不是公司整体而言是否「无力偿债」（直至公司所有资产变现为止，公司的状况仍可能波动），而是是否存在触发清盘制度的合资格债项。枢密院以 Lehman Brothers International Europe Ltd 清 盘后仍有巨额淨盈馀这个「最近最引人注目的例子」来支持它的说法，但这例子实际毫不相干。枢密院没有引用任何案例权威来支持其认为即使呈请债项不存在，亦不会使清盘程序无的主张。同样地，没有一个由枢密院引用，在 Salford 案前作出的判决支持这个不合逻辑的主张。

在Re Vitoria [1894] 2 QB 387 案中，英国上诉法庭关注如果债权人就一项判定债项提出的第一次破产清盘呈请因程序理由被驳回，该债权人是否可以再次根据相同的判定债项提出破产清盘呈请。显然，第一次破产清盘呈请程序不应被视为对相关判定债项的上诉。在此基础上，英国上诉法院在债权人第二次破产清盘呈请时向债务人发出破产令。不过，英国上诉法庭没有提出即使没有合资格债项，法院也有权宣布某人破产；恰恰相反，该案的破产令是由一项未被推翻撤销的判定债项支持。

在Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O’Brien [1990] HCA 8 案中，澳洲高等法院裁定，任何清盘人争议的债务均可提交法院或进行仲裁。这点是无争议的。然而，该案不涉及任何受仲裁条款管辖的呈请债项。无论如何，澳洲高等法院没有提出，即使不存在呈请债项，破产清盘程序亦不会无效。

在 Re Menastar Finance Ltd [2003] BCC 404 案中，英国高等法院考虑了一名债权人对清盘人接受一项判定债项的债权证明的挑战。该判定债项是清盘呈请原本的依据。由于挑战最终被驳回，该案当然不能支持公司可在没有合资格债项的情况下被清盘的主张。诚然，清盘人及法庭确实可调查判定债项，但只有存在欺诈、勾结或司法不公的证据时他们才可以这样做。因此，调查判定债项是一个例外情况，而不是一般常见的规则。更重要的是，「欺诈使一切变得无效」的原则没有理由只适用于调查判定债项，而不适用于清盘程序。

哪个机构有最终决定权?

有人可能会问：如果法庭可以在没有判决的情况下，基于具有管辖权的呈请债项将公司清盘，那麽为什麽当呈请债项受仲裁条款或专有外地司法管辖权条款管辖的情况下，法庭不能这样做呢？显然，如果法庭对呈请债项拥有管辖权，并且认为债务人对债项没有真正或实质的争议，除了 Re Menastar 列出的特殊情况外，我们可以安全地假设即使清盘人争议，法庭会一致地得出完全相同的结论，即确实存在债项。在有仲裁条款或专有外地司法管辖权条款的情况，这种假设则不再可靠。

我等谨认为，决定法庭是否可以在没有法庭判决或仲裁裁决的情况下发出清盘令的最终测试是：哪个机构—— 本地法院、仲裁庭、或外国法院—— 对呈请债项的实质理据拥有最终决定权？虽然枢密院在这个问题上似乎将仲裁条款等同专有外地司法管辖权条款，即仲裁庭或外国法院拥有专有管辖权 (Sian, [66])，两者存在一个关键的细微差别。

在普通法司法管辖区的仲裁法规中，除非当事人另有约定，实质上诉机制通常在局部情况下得到保留。例如，根据《香港仲裁条例》附表 2 第5 段及第 6 段，若在香港进行的仲裁程序中，仲裁庭作出的仲裁裁决所产生的法律问题是明显地错误，当事人可以就该法律问题向法庭提出上诉。因此，如果呈请债项是否存在是一个纯粹的法律问题，法庭可能有最终决定权，因为法庭可以採用一个极端的观点，认为任何与法庭观点矛盾的仲裁裁决在法律问题上都是「明显地错误」。然而，这个上诉机制不适用于事实问题，而且无论如何，亦不适用于外地判决，因此在该情况下，本地法庭对是否存在呈请债项没有最终决定权。

当法庭对呈请债项的实质理据没有最终决定权，法庭自然不能裁定呈请债项是否存在，满足法庭向债务人发出清盘令的先决条件。难怪儘管 Salford Estates 方 法 保 留 了 法 庭在此情况下，可依据特殊的因素向债务人发出清盘令的纯粹可能性，至今没有英国法院发现如此特殊的情 况 支 持 颁 令 清 盘 债 务 人 (Shaun Matos, “Arbitration Agreements and the Winding-Up Process: Reconciling Competing Values” (2023) 72 ICLQ 309, 313)。

平衡各项公共政策?

枢密院费力地强调，要求债权人在债项没有真正或实质的争议下进行仲裁，只会在没有任何好处下增加延误、麻烦和费用 (Sian, [92])。然而，枢密院迴避了一个问题，就是哪个机构 —— 本地法院、仲裁庭、或外国法院 —— 对呈请债项是否存在真正或实质争议有最终决定权。虽然清盘是一个重要的法定程序来有效地变现公司资产并公平分配予所有持份者(Sian, [32])，但它也是一个严苛的程序，会对公司业务造成严重干扰及对公司造成不可逆转的损害。权衡公司的合法利益及对整体经济的影响，除了成文法已订明且没有争议情况下，破产清盘的集体救济不应获轻易使用。

即使不完全肯定仲裁法规中的强制搁置条款（例如《香港仲裁条例》第20 条）是否适用，当呈请债项是由仲裁条款或专有外地司法管辖权条款管辖时，如说法庭不能或不应该採纳搁置或驳回破产清盘呈请的预设立场，则会犯下「否定前提」的谬误(即如果甲，则乙；不是甲，则不是乙) (Sian, [75])。我等谨认为，正确的问题不在于法庭的酌情权是否受到「束缚 」(Sian, [82], 引 用 Re Asia Master Logistics Ltd [2020] 2 HKLRD 423) 或「减少」(Sian, [83], 引用 But Ka Chon v Interactive Brokers LLC [2019] HKCA 873)，而是法庭考虑公司的偿债能力后，採取某种预设立场是否合理。我等谨认为，逻辑上当法庭不能对呈请债项是否存在有最终决定权，法庭的预设立场应为搁置或驳回破产清盘呈请，从而达致一致性并平衡公司的合法商业利益和整体经济的利益。

香港方法 : 孰好孰坏 ?

Salford Estates 方 法 在 Re Southwest Pacific Bauxite (HK) Ltd [2018] 2 HKLRD 449(「 Lasmos 方法」) 首次获本地法庭应用，儘管带有改动。前述两个方法的其中一个主要区别是 Lasmos 方法添加了一个要求，债务人公司需採取行动开展合同订明的争议解决程序。不论是 Guy Lam 上诉案或 Guy Lam 终审案还是其他判决， Lasmos方 法 至 今 未 得 到 正 式 认 可。 在 Re Simplicity & Vogue Retailing (HK) Co., Limited [2024] HKCA 299 案中，香港上诉法庭认为 Lasmos 方法施加的额外要求，由债务人展示真诚的意图进行仲裁，对债务人而言并不严苛。

正如作者于早前的文章提出，难以证明 Lasmos 方法施加的额外要求具法理基础。「不严苛」显然不能成为施加一个法律要求的正当理由。除了上述提出的担忧外，无论债务人公司是否已採取合同订明的步骤，这都不能改变当呈请债项受仲裁条款或专有外地司法管辖权条款管辖时，本地法院对呈请债项的实质理据没有最终决定权。 Shaun Matos 有同样担忧，并揭示了首要考虑仲裁庭而非仲裁协 议 的 荒 谬 (“Reconciling Competing Values”, 330)。

在Guy Lam 终审案，香港的最高法院採用了「多因素」方法，尝试平衡基于仲裁条款或专有外地司法管辖权条款而支持搁置或驳回破产清盘呈请的强而有力的因由，与其他对抗的因素，例如近乎琐屑无聊或滥用司法程序的争议。我等谨认为，这方法既危险又易被操纵，理应避免，因为它孕育了新瓶旧酒的倾向 —— 例如在 Sun Entertainment Culture Limited v Inversion Productions Limited [2023] HKCFI 2400 案中，香港高等法院原讼法庭暂委法官郭美超女士以公司的抗辩琐屑无聊为由下令清盘，即在法庭因仲裁条款适用而没有最终决定权的情况下审理了抗辩的实质理据。

总结

毋庸置疑，仲裁与破产清盘之间的相互关係是重要的议题。正如枢密院所承认的，绝大多数清盘呈请均涉及债务 (Sian, [27])。不幸地，枢密院偏离了合乎逻辑的 Salford Estates 方法并返回传统方法，完全无视进行清盘前，须有合资格债项的法定要求，何况法庭没有亦不可能对呈请债项的实质理据有任何最终决定权。我等理解即使呈请债项由仲裁条款管辖，法庭仍希望保留该情况下的清盘制度(Sian, [93])，但不应忘记在破产清盘法规中，法庭仍有其他途径以更自然及合乎逻辑的方式将公司清盘，例如引用资不抵债或公正公平的原则。法院无需扭曲逻辑来作出不可能的事情。我等希望英国法院能及时改变取态，而香港法院也能为普通法这个领域的发展作出合乎逻辑的贡献。

理解仲裁庭管辖权和申索的可受理性之间区别： 当白天变成黑夜

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(这篇文章发表在 2023 年四月香港律师会会刊 )

引言

多重仲裁协议，即普遍要求合约双方在进行仲裁前进行善意谈判或调解，并不罕见。尽管当事人可能合理地期望仲裁只应于仲裁前要求获遵守后进行，现实或会让人意外。

在 C v D [2021] 3 HKLRD 1 (HKCFI);[2022] 3 HKLRD 116 (HKCA) 中，香港法院考虑了若当事人不遵守仲裁前要求而进行仲裁，是否构成对仲裁庭理解仲裁庭管辖权的挑战。香港原讼法庭和上诉法庭基于仲裁庭的管辖权与申索的可受理性两项概念之间的区别，裁定除非当事人另有明确说明，否则不遵守仲裁前要求属「申索可受理性的问题，而非仲裁庭管辖权的问题」。由于此项挑战被裁定在本质上不涉及仲裁庭的管辖权，法庭不能审查裁决的正确性。因此，正如 C v D 案一样，不论仲前要求是否获遵守，仲裁庭仍有管辖权而仲裁实际上可以进行。这显然违背当事人的合理期望。本文将批判地审视仲裁庭管辖权与申索可受理性之间的区别，以及 C v D 案的理据。就本文而言，我们假定「除非 X，否则不得提起仲裁」和「在 X 的情况下，双方可进行仲裁」并 无 区 别（Republic of Sierra Leone v SL Mining Ltd [2021] EWHC 286 (Comm)）。本文将论证最终的问题是挑战是否涉及仲裁庭的管辖权。我等谨提出挑战如关乎仲裁前要求未获当事人遵守，则应被定性为涉及仲裁庭的管辖权。

C v D

在 C v D 案中，C 对 D 提起诉讼以撤销 D 在未遵守仲裁条款内的仲裁前要求的情况下获得的部分裁决。该仲裁条款要求双方须先尝试进行为期 60 工作天的真诚谈判，然后方可将任何未解决的争议提交在香港进行的仲裁。

香港原讼法庭裁定而香港上诉法庭随后确认，C 的挑战涉及的是申索的可受理性而不是仲裁庭的管辖权，因此法庭不会审查有关裁决的正确性。法庭的理由如下：

  1. 仲裁庭的管辖权与申索的可受理性之间存在区别。
  2. 正如新加坡上诉法庭在 BBA v BAZ [2020] SGCA 53（关于时效的挑战）和 BTN v BTP [2020] SGCA105（关于已判事项的挑战）中解释，区别仲裁庭管辖权与申索可受理性的测试实质上是「仲裁庭相对申索」的测试，即该挑战是否针对仲裁庭（由于仲裁协议出现缺失或遗漏，该申索不应进行仲裁），还是针对申索本身（由于该申索自身存在缺陷，故根本不应提出）。在这两宗案件中，新加坡上诉法庭裁定，基于时效和已判事项的挑战仅针对申索本身，性质上不涉及管辖权。
  3. 管辖权和申索可受理性之间的区别可能模糊不清，有时难以知道两者甚么时候开始及终结，就像白天过渡至黑夜时，总有暮色时分（Robert Merkin and Louis Flannery, Merkin and Flannery on the Arbitration Act 1996 (6th edn, Rotledge 2019), [30.3]）。
  4. 仲裁协议没有表明当事人意图把遵守仲裁前要求视为管辖权的问题，而且当事人似乎不太可能意图在仲裁庭进行全面聆讯和作出决定后，以诉讼方式重启案件。

仲裁庭管辖权和申索的可受理性：存在区别还是二元对立？

作为一项初步观察，当考虑挑战是否涉及仲裁庭管辖权时，香港原讼法庭和上诉法庭均裁定不遵守仲裁前要求涉及「申索的可受理性，而非仲裁庭管辖权」。我等的愚见为这种表述不太合适，因为它隐含了申索的可受理性与仲裁庭管辖权属二元对立的意思。

尽管申索的可受理性和仲裁庭管辖权之间可能存在区别，但这两个概念不一定互相排斥，单一事件有可能同时引起对申索的可受理性和仲裁庭管辖权的挑战。这点可以参考英国上议院在 Fiona Trust and Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [17] 中给出的一个例子：如果同一份文件包含主协议和仲裁协议，而其中一方当事人声称他从未同意该文件的任何内容，其签名亦是伪冒的，则会同时构成对主协议及仲裁协议有效性的质疑。

因此，我等谨认为，在考虑挑战是否涉及仲裁庭的管辖权时，提及申索可受理性此概念的作用不大。最终问题应是挑战是否涉及仲裁庭的管辖权（即针对仲裁庭）。

涉及仲裁前要求的挑战本质上针对仲裁庭的管辖权

分析的出发点是不同案例曾各自归类仲裁前要求为涉及仲裁庭的管辖权、申索的可受理性或程序的问题（Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2021), 988-989, 997-999）。公道来说，不同法律体系之间没有统一的做法。

鉴于意见不一，有人认为在诠释仲裁前要求时，当事人的意图应获考虑，正如香港原讼法庭和上诉法庭声称在 C v D 案中所做的一样。遗憾地，相对于审查挑战背后的基本事实以确定当事人的真实意图，香港法庭实际只是宣布有关仲裁的司法政策（例如速度、终局性等），以及相应于当事人意图的法律推定——即法庭推定当事人有意将仲裁前要求归于申索的可受理性，故须由仲裁庭专门处理。这种司法政策和法律推定的应用显然是循环的：当事人挑战仲裁庭管辖权机制完全在仲裁制度之内，不能说成当事人同意仲裁，即代表当事人为了速度和终局性，意图将本来应获适当归类为涉及仲裁庭管辖权的挑战视为不牵涉仲裁庭管辖权。香港法庭的做法只是重复了须适当归类仲裁前要求的问题。

本文须指出，时效的问题（如 BBA v BAZ）和已判事项的问题（如 BTN v BTP）属申索的可受理性的经典例子。这些问题质疑「申索」本身（针对一个特定的申索而不是其他潜在的申索），亦没有以任何形式针对仲裁庭。换句话说，撇开挑战不谈，仲裁庭拥有一般管辖权就任何其他不受时效或已判事项限制的申索作出裁决。

然而，因不遵守仲裁前要求而衍生的挑战的性质截然不同。仲裁前要求未获遵守的挑战不会以时效问题或已判事项问题的方式攻击「该申索」本身——事实上，仲裁前要求未获遵守的挑战并不会攻击某特定「申索」，而是广乏针对仲裁协议涵盖的所有申索，因此除了该些受仲裁前要求约束的申索之外，仲裁庭根本没有其他事项可作出任何裁决。我等谨认为，这显示仲裁庭实际上没有任何一般管辖权。为了进一步阐释 Merkin and Flannery 第 30.3 段中白天与黑夜的比喻，白天不会因移除了一束光线而变成黑夜，但如果根本没有光线，那就肯定是黑夜了。无论如何，诠释仲裁前要求为涉及仲裁庭管辖权的问题也符合当事人的意图，因为此项诠释为当事人的意图提供了双重保障（即在仲裁庭层面及在法院层面），确保除非当事人遵守仲裁前要求，否则不得进行任何仲裁。

真正的担忧

法庭真正的担忧似乎是，当是否进行仲裁是取决于某些仲裁前步骤时，如果一方当事人不采取该些步骤，另一方就可撤回对仲裁的承诺（Alexander Jolles, “Consequences of Multi-tier Arbitration Clauses: Issues of Enforcement” (2006) 72 Arbitration: The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 329, 335）。这种担忧是误解。

即使仲裁前要求未获遵守，它不会自动容许无错失的一方退出仲裁协议（Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (1st supp, 34th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2022), [4-197] – [4-203] )。未遵守仲裁前要求的一方仍可能稍后遵守仲裁前要求以展开仲裁。由于仲裁协议仍然有效、可实行或可履行，《仲裁条例》（第 609 章）第 20 条适用于阻止在仲裁前要求获遵守之前提起的诉讼。

当然，如果违约一方明确表明不会履行仲裁前要求，则多重仲裁协议可能因预期违约而被废除。在这种情况下，无错失一方有权决定是否接受悔约，或仍然选择仲裁。若无错失一方接受悔约，当事人的争议应通过法庭诉讼解决，而违约一方必须承担悔约的后果。

有意见认为「这不符合当事人的意图 」（Jolles, “Consequences of Multitier Arbitration Clauses”, 335）， 但 须谨记法律上预设的争议解决机制是法庭诉讼。作为法庭诉讼以外的例外情况，双方当事人可以在同意的范围内进行仲裁。然而，若出于任何原因仲裁不能在双方最初设定的范围内进行，无可避免地双方须按照法律的施行回到法庭诉讼，而在此方面双方的意图是不相干。

正确的方法

仲裁是经当事人同意的争议解决程序。仲裁协议可反映当事人同意进行仲裁。我等恭敬的陈词认为，决定一项挑战是否涉及仲裁庭管辖权的正确方法为考虑 (a) 该挑战是否攻击构成仲裁庭管辖权基础的仲裁协议，以及 (b) （除了受挑战的申索外）是否存在其他仲裁庭可以作出裁决的申索。

应用这个方法，C v D 案中的挑战显然涉及仲裁庭的管辖权：该挑战攻击仲裁协议，因为仲裁协议中的仲裁前要求据称未获遵守；除了那些受到质疑的申索之外，并无其他仲裁庭可作裁决的申索。

总结

鉴于仲裁作为一个受欢迎的争议解决机制的重要性，而多重仲裁协议亦很普遍，无庸置疑，不遵守仲裁前要求的挑战是否涉及仲裁庭的管辖权并须受到法庭审查是一个具有广乏重要性的问题。C v D 案目前被上诉至香港终审法院。我等谨希望香港终审法院会为仲裁当事人就仲裁前要求的正确诠释提供最终指引。